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PREFACE 
The dilemma of the Holy Land has been an anachronism of all historical 
times. The earliest history of the Bible indicates that the problem of possession 
has long been the source of much war and strife. At its best this area of limited 
resources is of I ittle value with the exception of the tremendous treasure of 
religious monuments and archeological ruins. It is perhaps over these things of 
smal I material value that make the region unique in modern international rela-
tions. Strangely enough, the religions spawned or nurtured in this barren, 
almost desert land have emanated and intruded into the four corners of the 
earth. There is hardly a nation on the international scene today that is not 
either directly or indirectly affected by the political tensrons of this highly 
controversial area. 
This thesis endeavors to integrate and correlate the political, economic 
and geographical features that have contorted this region into its present situ-
ation. The scattering of the "Tribes of Israel II and the Zionistic movement are 
of special interest because they show the redundancy of the state of Israel. The 
upsurge of national ism in this area is al so to be noted~ Last, but not least, is 
the potential threat that this area is one of the geo-pol itical ly recognized places 
that could wel I set off a world conflict. 
Source materials include official documents and publications of the 
111 
United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office. Other govern-
mental publications are included •. Also, reference books in geography, political i 
science, history and related subjects were used to expand on certain points of 
interest contained in the governmental pub I ications. 
The writer would like to point out that his interest ih this subject has 
been greatly enhanced by the fact that he resided in the Middle East for over a 
year and has see·n, first hand, the strange influence it fosters on the minds of 
people, particularly the Holy Land. 
It is only fitting and proper that the writer acknowledge that he is in-
debted to several persons for the consummation of this thesis. The writer is 
indebted to the faculty of the Geography Department for their assistance; espe-
cially to Dr. Edward E. Keso, my adviser, to Dr. Ralph E. Birchard and 
Mr. James L. Stine for their encouragement. Finally, to Mr. Jack E. Moore 
for his moral support and his initial efforts of my introduction to the Geography 
faculty. To the library staff of the Oklahoma State University go particular 
thanks for their kindness and understanding which rea!lymade this study possible. 
Mrs. Marguerite S. Howland was most helpful in the finding and use of govern-
mental documents. The termination of these acknowledgements must of certainty 
belong to my family for.patience, understanding and encouragement during this 
extended effort. 
R. W. V. 
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CHAPTER I 
THLRELIGIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE HOLY LA~D 
The dilemma of the t-loly Land is: 11 To whom does it belong? 11 An uneasy 
truce is maintained today along an armistice line established by the armistice 
agreements of 1949 and, according to Secretary of ~tote Dulles, there were three 
basic problems to be solved: (]} The tragic plight pf 900,000 refugees who. for-
merly lived on the territory now occupii~d by Israel; (2) the pall of fear hanging 
alike over Arabs and Israel is, and ( 3) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries be-
tween Israel and its neighbors. 1 The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the 
background and factors involved in the third problem, the boundaries of Israel. 
This chapter wil I deal with th~ ancient Bil::il ical and historical political bounda-
ries in the area adjacent to the Dead Sea and .Jordan river valley; an area com-
' 
monly refer11ed to as Palestine, which means the home of the Philistine. For 
simplicity, the boundaries will be discussed chronologically as follows: (1) Bib-
Ii cal times (general I y under Hebrew influence}; ( 2) the Christian Era; ( 3) the 
Moslem period of Arab Ottom~n and Turkish influence; and (4) the modern con~ 
cept of the mandate of the League of Nations • 
. 
1 United States Department of State Pub! ication, United States Pol icy in 
the Near East, South Asia and Africa - 1955, Near and Middle Eastern Series-
No. 20, (Washington, 1956),° p. 13. ( Hereafter referred to as U. S. Depart-,. 
ment of State Publication) 
The Hebrew Period: The Divine Discipline 
The Hebrew claim to Palestine is clearly illustrated in the Holy Bible. The 
· Lord said unto Moses: 11and I come down to deliver them ( children of Israel) out of 
the hand of the Egyptians and to bring them up out of that land unto a good land, 
and a large land, unto a land flowing with milk and honey, unto the place of the 
Canaanites and the Hittites and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites 
Cind the Jebusites/112 This was to become known as the Promised Land for the de-· 
scendants of Abraham and it was to that portion of this land to be seen west of the 
Dead Sea from the heights of Mt. Nebo that Moses wqs to lead his people •. With 
the settlement of the tribes of Israel in Palestine it was divided with I ittle thought 
to boundaries; however, in time to come· it was more particularly divided between 
the kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Based upon the above, it would not be improper 
for the Jewish people to lay claim to most of the eastern- shores of the Mediterran-
ean and to include part of Turkey, Lebanon and Syria in- addition to Palestine and 
Jordan. The claim proper has been restri.cted to Palestine by the fact that through-
out the ages the sphere of Jewish influence has been restricted to that Qrea. 
During the period in question the Jews have very I ittle claim to the area 
in terms of possession. Off and on during th is time· they were overrun by various 
invaders and were a part of the· second Bqbylonian (Assyric;m) Empire. They be-
came a colony of the Roman Empire in 218 B. C. and remained so until the fall 
of the- Empire. 
2King James Version, Holy Bible, Exodus 3:8. 
2 
The Christian Era: The Corporatism of Rome 
- Following the time of Hebrew influen·ce was 9 short period of rule con-
·nected with the development and spread of Christianity~ This was "The Patriar-
chate of Jerusalem, 11 established by Constantine· in Byzantine Times. 3 _ It was 
.Christian, politically, and remained so until overrun by the Persians in 604 A.O. 
They were aided by the Jews and the Christians_ were massacred. The Jews had 
hoped to gain possession of the area and establish an autonomous state; however, 
fote dealt them out in the form of a far more powerfLJI enerny, the followers of 
Muhammad ( lslamites) who conquered the country in 636. 
The Continuum of Islam: The Vacuous Regime 
The followers of Islam have a longer claim, in te·rms of possession, to 
t-he Holy Land than any of the three contending religious groups. The Arab in-
fluence in one form or another remained intact, with the exception of the 
Crusades, over P9lestine until General .Allenby entered the city of Jerusalem 
on December l l, 1917 (see Appendix A)f From 636 to l 105 the area was 
under the Arab Caliphs .. By 1187 the Crusaders were firmly entrenched in Pal-
estine and the Latin States had been formed. This interim Christiqn influence 
lasted until the fall of Acre in 1293, thus giving the Christians a claim, at 
least in terms of possession, as great as the Jews. In the time fol lowing, 
3James Parkes, ~History of Palestine, (New York, 1949), P· 72. 
4 u. S. Department of State Publication, Mandate for Palestine, Neqr 
Eastern Series No. 1, (Washington, 1931 ), p. 10. -
3 
4 
Palestine was under the influence of Mamluk (slave) Sultans until 1517 when it 
became a part of the Ottoman Empire. This arrangement survived until the 
Turkish Territorial Divisions of 1914. From the fall of Acre until the British 
took Jerusalem is the latter portion of Moslem influence. 
The- Days of Zion: lhe G)llemma and the Enigma 
The problem of t.he territorial rights and claims to the Holy Land was a 
11 leftover11 from World War I. It provided a great deal of discussion for the 
League of Nations and, pushed by the British, a Mqndate was issued in l 923 es-
· tabl ishing firm boundaries in the Holy Land for the first time in several years. 5 
The establishment of Palestine as a national home of the Jews was advocated, 
This was advanced and perpetuated by the Zionistic movement, a return of the 
Jews to Jerusalem, and gained favor of the British governme·nt. The United 
States position was that it should be neither Jewish nor Arab, al thou~h they 
agreed to the mandate. This position was reaffirmed in the State Department 
Report of April 20,. 1946. 6 The mandate was dissolved in May, 1948 following 
considernble fighting and disorder between the Arabs and Jews. On the 15th 
of May the United States had sugg,ested a temporary truce and the establishment 
pf a trusteeship to be administered by the United Nations; however, on the 14th 
5 1bid., pp. 10-20, p. 107. (See Appendix A) 
9u. S. Department of State Pub! ication, Anglo American Committee of 
Inquiry, Report of the United States Government and His Majesty's Gov~rnment 
in the United Klngdooi, 1946, Near Eastern Series No. 2, (Washington, 1946), 
pp. vii and 49. 
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of May the Jewish National Council, meeting at Tel Aviv, formally declared the 
establishment of a Jewish state, to be called Israel, in the area allotted to the 
Jews by the United Nations. 7 The State was imme·diate!y recognized by the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The·present Armistice 
Une established by the United Nations is shown in figure 1, and a comparison 
with figure 2 shows the remarkable similarity between the ancient and new Israel. 
An almost equal portion of land inside Palestine has been given to Jordan compar-
ctive to that portion of ancient Palestine that lay in Jordan. 
In the disputed area I ies the enigma of the dilemma of the Holy Lands, 
Jerusalem, a city separated by an Armistice Line (see figure 3 ). The city is. 
divided between the Arab and Jew, however, it is of more-historical importance 
to the Christian than to either Arab or Jew from a religious viewpoint. 8 Through-
out all discussions and mediations over this area, no action has been initiated or 
suggested that the city is of great importance to Christianity, particularly since 
the Moslems (in.the 3rd Sura of Muhammed) proclaimed that the- Promised Land 
was really the area around Mecca and not Jerusa!em 1 thus ·relegating th~ir inter-
est from the religious concept. 
Another problem as to the Jewish establishment of a national home and 
state lies in the following statement by Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secre-
tary of State: 11 To the Israel is I say that you should come to truly look upon 
7 U. S. Department of State Pub! ication, Background Jordan;- Near and 
Middle Eastern Series No. 191 (Washington, 1955 )u p. 2. 
BJames Parkes, A History of_ Palestine, (New York, 1949), p. 183. 
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8 
yourse·I ves as a Middle Eastern state bnd see your own future in that context rather 
than as a headquarters, or nucleus so to speak, of worldwide groupings of peoples 
of a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations 
to the Israeli State •••• , 11 inshort, a de·scription v~ry wel I fitting what could be 
referred to as a II Jewish Vatican. u9 This is a problem that could very easily 
bring about much agitation, especidl ly from other world-wide established rel i-
gious groups. (See Appendix B) 
With all of the obove in mind, it is not difficult to understand that the 
. . . 
truce that exists irr the Holy Land is an uneasy. one, marked each day by claims 
arid counterclaims of violations, atrocities and locat war. lQ This situation is a 
most unhappy one and positive action is required to bring about o solution that is 
agreeable to Arab, (:hristion and Jew alike.· The latest United Sttjtes positi~n is 
broad and without compunction as shown by the followh1g ·taken from a discussion 
between-Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, January ;1(), 1956. 11 . 
I 
It was agreed that ,every effort should be made to. reduce the sources of misunder-
standinghetween the Middle Eastern Nations, whose peoples should be helpe~ 
to achieve 11 their legifirmate aspirations. 11 Similarly, an Arab-Jewish settlement 
was considered urgent, bvt possible only if both sides were 11wil I ing to reconcile 
9u. S. Department of State Publication, United States Pol icy in the 
Near East 1 .South Asia and Africa - 1954, Near and Miadle Eastern Series 
No. 1a;-(Washington, 1955), p. 23-. -
101bid., P· 23. 
ll U. S. Oepartriien.t of State Pub I ication, United States Pol icy in the 
l\lear East, South Asia q~d Africa - 1955, Near and Middle Eastern Series 
No. 20, (Washington, 195~), p. 54-. -
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10 
the positions 11 hitherto taken. On this provocative and apparently negative· note 
the situation now stands. In the recommendations one possible solution wi 11 be 
given. 
In summary it should be noted that the dilem_mo of the Holy Land is al-: 
most a universal tragedy with responsibility divided amongst the British, the 
Arabs, the Jews and Christian Churches. 12 · All have political, religious and 
other historical claims. All have suffered unstable tenures, including the pre-
sent ownerships. Therefore, it appears that the only solution lies i11 the estab-
I ishment by the United Nations of a commission to form what woufd be known 
as 11World Monuments and International Parks II with the Holy Land as the first 
area of consideration. It is recognized that there would be many problems; 
however I the eventual outcome foresees a solution to a hitherto unsolved prob-
lem of ownership and offers a precedent for the solution of similar problems in 
other parts of the world. 
12 
, James Parkes, A. History of Palestine, (New York, 1949), p. 361. 
CHAPTER II 
THE PHYSIOGRAPHY OF 
THE JORDAN RIVER VALLEY .AND VICINITY 
Physicql Features 
Israel is about the size and shape of New Jersey. It has a fertile coastal 
plain with ample rainfall. In the north are the streams and hills of Galilee; in 
the center, the stony Judean mountains; and stretching southward, the Negev, a 
triangular desert area which gives the country an outlet to the Red Sea. To a 
degree, Israel and Jordan are separated by the Jordan River Valley I with Israel 
to the west and Jordan to the east. Jordan is about the size of Indiana. Geo-
graphically, it occupies a central position in that area from the Mediterranean 
to the Arabian Sea, known as the Middle East. The greater part of the country 
stretches east and south from the Jordan River Valley in a wide 11V. 11 West of 
the Jordan river, the Kingdom encompasses a significant portion of the Holy 
Land. 1 
By reason of its situation and structure, a land bridge is formed between 
· Africa and Eurasia across Palestine and Jordan. This comparatively fertile area 
1 U. S. Department of State Publication, Background Jordan, Near and 
Middle Eastern Series No. 19, (Washington, 1955), p. 1. 
11 
12 
a I so attracts the desert nomads. 
Palestine is cut into two parts by a deep , wide trough passing through it 
longitudinally. Through this trough runs the Jordan ri ver and here, too , lie three 
lakes supplied with water by that stream. Because of the trough, the division 
made by the Jordan river makes it an important pol iti cal I ine of demarcation. 2 
. Eastern and western Palestine both represen t elevated table lands. This is par-
ticularly clear in the east , wh ile weste rn Palest ine has been cut more deeply , 
due largely to the greater amount of ra infal I and consequent e ros ion. The moun-
tainous region to the east of the Jordan is intersected by three deep clefts. The 
most northerly is the valley of the Yarmuk rive r, shown in Figure 4. The plateau 
north of the Yarmuk fol Is away in a steep slope towards the sea of Galilee , and 
is composed of a fertile mixture of tufa and red-brown earth. To the south lies 
the Jabbok river and between it and the Yarmuk I ies a mountainous a rea , stil I 
heavily wooded. The third valley is fo rmed by the Amon river which is deeply 
imbedded in a canyon that empties into the Dead Sea . 
The Jordan Riv~r Valley is a geograph ica l phenomena unique on earth 
because it is farther below sea level (- 1286°) than a ny other valley in the world. 3 
As mentioned before, there a re three lakes that remain from an ancient sea bed: 
Hui eh , the Sea of Gali lee , and the Dead Sea . The northern part of the valley 
is luxuriant. In springtime, the ampl y watered pla in recei ves 30 inches annual 
2u. S. Department of State Publication, Mandate fo r Palestine , Near 
Eastern Series No. 1, (Washington , 1931) , p . 7. (See Appendix A) 
3Joseph E. Williams , Prenti ce-Hal l Worl d Atlas , (New Jersey , 1959), 
p. 71. 
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Physical Map of Palestine 
roinfal I. 4 The highest amount of roinfol I in the area is 60 inches annual mean 
on the Lebanon slopes of Mt. Hermon. 5 Around Lake Hui eh and above all the 
western shores of the Seo of Galilee, flowers and vegetation grow abundantly. 
Below the joining of the Jobbok river with the Jordon, the volley may be de-
scribed as o desert. Vegetation is restricted to the vicinity of springs which 
ore sporadic in location. 
The Dead Seo fully justifies its name. Owing to the high mineral con-
tent of its water (sodium chloride, bromides, etc.) it hos o salinity six times 
the normal ocean content. Fish die within moments ofter trespassing into the 
Dead Seo. 
To the west of the Jordon River Volley o ridge is formed by o mountain 
chain running north and south. These compose the Judean Mountains and the 
Hills of Galilee. To the northwest of the Seo of Galilee, the peaks rise to 
more than 3500 feet, where the ridge then falls away in the plain of Jezreel. 
In the south, between the straight coast I ine and the central mountain 
ridge, ore situated-from west to east-a narrow belt of dunes, a very fertile 
coastal area and o series of gently-sloping hills. This area is known as the 
Shepheloh. To the south of the Shephelah is the Negeb (Negev), a limestone 
plateau extending to the desert of Sinai to the west, the Arabian desert to the 
east. It is o veritable desert itself that terminates southward on the Gulf of 
4Emil G. Kroel ing, Bible Atlas, (New York, [yeof! ), p. 38. 
5w. G. Kendrew, The Climates of the Continents, (London, 1953), 
p. 24.7. - -
14 
Aqabah. 
Geologists report that the rocks of this area are marine sedimentary 
beds representing deposition during several stages of the Cretace.ous perioq. 
Sometime long after this deposition, and still before human history, the area 
Wqs subjected to crustal warping and faulting. Some segments were elevated 
I 
several thousand feet above sea level while others were depressed into great 
troughs. The sea coast of Palestine and the great trough (El Ghor) of the Jordan 
Valley are examples of the depressed areas. 6 
Climate 
· Typical of the Mediterranean area, the climate of Israel is mild with a 
wet winter season and a dry hot summer. In the hills (highest: Mt. Atzmon, 
3,962 feet, in upper Galilee), and on the plateau which separates the Jordan 
Vapey from the coastal plain, the winters are cold and snowfalls are not un-
usugl. Winds, generally from the Mediterranean, have a moderating influence 
in the summer. Around the Dead Sea.and in the Negev, where winters are mild, 
summer temperatures frequent I y exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit. There is practi-
cally rio rai·nfal I in the Negev, but enough in Galilee to enable a wide variety 
of vegetables and grains to be cultivated •. Rainfall is erratic in the area as 
shown by the drought conditions of 1953 fol lowed by the ample, wel I-distributed 
rains in 1954. In much of the country flash floods are not uncommon, and 
6 . ' 
Rand McNally and Company, Bible Atlas, (New York,[yec:11:J ), 
pp. 33-34. --· -
J.5 
16 
n~arly all tributary streams are wadies (dry beds except in the rainy season). Pre-
cipitation is I ike·ly to come down in two or three torrential drenchings over a short 
space of time, swelling usually dry stream beds and carrying off topsoil. 7 Only 
a few short coastal rivers, such as the Yarkon and Kishon, have a continuous flow. 
By far the most life-giving stream in the entire region is the River Jordan. This is 
an inland river with headwaters near Mt. Hermon (9,232 feet) and terminates in 
the below-sea-level, salt-laden Dead Sea (-1, 286 feet). 
The fol lowing climatic information is taken from Kendrew to help show 
the climatic conditions of this region:8 
Mean Average Mean Temperature Mean Average 
Temperature (F) Range Precipitation (in.) 
Haifa 71 26 24.4 
(El. 52 1) 
Jerusalem 63 28 15.9 
(E I • 2, 485 e) 
Jericho 74 31 5.0 
(El. -820 1) 
In Jordan the climate is somewhat similar with the exception of being 
located farther inland from the Mediterranean than Israel. Throughout the hilly 
part of the country, the climate is generally of the Mediterranean type except 
7u. S. Department of State Pub! ication, Background Israel, Near and 
Middle Eastern Series No. 17, (Washington, 1954), p. 4. 
8 
W. G. Kendrew, The Climate of the Continents, (London, 1953), 
p. 246. 
17 
that the summers are not quite so hot and the winters-are cooler •. Snow is not uli'.-
. ' 
usual in the higher altitudes. The west bank of the Jordan has a better rainfaJI 
than the east. In the lower Jordan Valley~ as in the outlying desert regions, rbin-
fall is sligh.t and summer heat intense. 9 
The general cl imqte in this area is truly Mediterranean and is affected by 
both altitude and latitude. lO The land rises eastward from the coast and reaches 
heights of around 3,000 fee·t, where high-steppe condiHons prevail. Natur<iilly, 
the great cleft of the Jordan valley is a striking topographical and climatic fea-
, ' 
ture forming a dry pocket that becomes more desert-like in the lower fotitudes. 
East of the plateau of Palestine, the Mediterranean climate succumbs to arid 
desert wastelands. Thus Jordan, for the most part, has a problem in wc;iter supply; 
whereas Israel does benefit from the coastal upslope rainfal I. 
9· . ',' --
u .. S •. Depqrtment of State Publication, Background Jordan, Near and 
Middle Eastern Series No. 19, (Washington, 1955), p. 4. 
10w. G. Kendrew, The Climate of the Continents, (~ondon, 1953), 
p. 246. 
CHAPTER !!! 
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF !SRAEL AND JORDAN 
Israel 
Israel, as a newly independent s,tater has existed since May 141 1948. 
It is a Republic and, previous to its independence; was a part of the British man-
date for Palestine. It has an area of about 8 1 000 square miles (exact figure not 
obtainable due to undefined borders) and a population of 2 1 1149 000. l The pdn-
cipal cities are as follows: Tel Aviv, on the central Mediterranean coast; has 
500,000 inhabitants and is the countris largest city. it occupies a unique posi-
Hon in this ancient land; for it was founded le,ss than 50 years ago and became 
the first capitol when Israel was proclaimed a nation. Haifa; to the northf with 
a metropolitan population of 220,000 1 ranks second, has a flne natural harbor 
and is the main port. The third largest city and present location of the govem-
ment is the new portion of Jerusalemu which has a total population (both !srae! 
and Jordan side,s) of 167,613. This portion is sealed off from the older section 
of the city by a no man°s land several blocks wide and the older section is under 
the control of the Jordan Government (see figure 3). Although the city is 
1 Pub! ication of United Nationsu Monthly Bu! letin of Statistics, ( New 
York, January 1 1961L p. 3. 
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TABLE'- I. PALE!ff!NE/!SRAEL: OUTPUT OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES · 
(Thousands of metric tons, •except as indicated) 
Industry.or product 1928 1938 
Flour. ., '• 
Chocolate, &wtets and jams 
Canned fruits . 
Preserved and pickled vegetables . 
Citrus. beverages a 
Refined oils . 4.0 6.1 b 
Margarine. 
Beer A. J.7 
Wine a 1.8 3.1 
Other alcoholic beverages 4 
Cigarettes . . . . • . . . o.s 0.6 
Cotton and mixed fabricsd 
Plywood•. 
Tires' 
Tubes•. 
Alcohol. 
Superphosphates . 
Sulphuric acid i, 
Matches1 • 110.7 237.6 
Soap. 8.0 
Detergents 
Motor spirit • 
~erosenc ·. 
Heavy oils 
Plate glass t 
Cement. •· 59.2 98.0 
Nails and rivets 
Electric bulbs .1:. 
Motor vehicles, assembled• . 
Diamonds 1 
SoullCE: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel; 
Statistical Office of the United Nations; S. B. Himadeh, Economic 
Organization ·of Pal,,tine (Beirut, 1938); Government of Palestine, 
Stalisllcs of Imports, Exports and Shipping (Jerusalem); Statistical 
Abstract of Palestine, 1944-45 (Palestine, 1946). 
a Millions of litres. 
b 1934-1938 avcraac, olive oil only, 
• Olive oil only. 
d Milliooa of.metres. 
1946 J9JO 19$4' 
158.1 252.0 
10.7 12.6 
J.O 3.0 
7.3 7.0 
6.4 IS.I 
1.4• 12,5 14.2 
4.0 7.8 7.8 
18.1 12.3 14.3 
3.1 3.1 
3.1 3.6 
1.2 J.S 2.0 
12.6 
7.61 15.7 
144.9 
109.6 
0.7 0.4 
8.0 10.S 
43.7 
291.8 381.S 
9.0 9A 
0.9 9.2 
646 30 165 
361 27 137 
137 587 
1.0 1.7 
.2ss.o 380.1 563.1 
.2.01 3.0 
2.1 
3.4 
138.om 119.S 185 .. 1 
• Thousands of cubic metres. 
I 1952. 
• Thousands. 
h In terms of 98.4 per cent HaSO,. 
l Thousand gross of boxes. 
i Millions of square metres. 
.I: Millions. 
I Thousands of carats; exports only. 
M )945. 
19JJ 
233.8 
13.8 
2.8 
8.4 
19.0 
17.7 
10.0 
Vt6 
7.4 
·S.4 
2.0 
21.3 
171.0 
117.8 
0.4 
101.3 
71.3 
389.1 
9.2 
10.s 
188 
139 
631 
1.4 
663.S 
3.1 
2.8 
2,6 
229.S 
J9J6 
242.1 
12.0 
3.1 
12.l 
16.7 
21.8 
9.7 
13.0. 
9.1 
3.9 
2.1 
21.3 
.187.8 
m.1 
0.4 
9S.S 
73.3 
385.8 
10.2 
10.2 
612.8 
2.8 
2.9 
263.7 
Courtesy o.f'United:Nations 
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under- 11defacto 11 control of Israel ahd Jordan, the United States has nof, in view 
of standing United Nations resolutions , recognized the sovereignty of either 
country over the portions of Jerusalem they hold . There are nearly 20 other 
cities with a population of 15,000 or more, among them a re : Acre , with turrets 
and battlements recalling the crusades; Roman-built Tiberias , still a favored 
vacat ion spot; Nazareth , the largest Arab set tlement; Jaffa, o secondary port; 
and Safad, where many of the early immig rants settled. 2 
Located between Tel Aviv or;id Jerusalem is the Lydda Airport, terminus 
of Israel 's El Al Airlines , and also served by other international I ines. Local 
air service is provided between cities. In addi t ion, the country is linked by 
618 kilometers of state-owned rail lines and a good system of paved roads . It 
is possible to- drive the entire length of Israel in one day. Also , in 1958 Israel 
had 30 vessels in its me rchant ma rine. 3 
- Agriculture is the most important industry in Is rael . The most important 
20 
crop and biggest export is ci trus fruit grown on the sandy , well-watered , fe rt ile 
coastal plain. 4 Between 1952 and 1959, land under irr igation in Israel increased 
from 162,000 acres to 300,000 acres. Citrus production increased from 3~2, 000 
2u. S. Deportment of State Publ icotion , The Newly Independent Na t ions , 
_ Israel , Near and Middle Eastern Seri es 58 , (Washington , D. C. , 1960), ·p. 1. 
3Publication pf the United Nations, The Development of Manufacturing 
Industry in Egypt, Israel , ond __ Turkey , (New York , 1958) , p. 96. 
4u. S. Depar,tment of State Publication , The Newly Independent Nations , 
Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 58 , (Washington , D. C. , 1960) , p. 4. 
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tons to 570,000 tons.5 There is mixed forming in the valley areas and other 
agricultural activities ind ude vineyard cultivation and poultry raising. There 
are plantations to be found that produce such items as tobacco and olives. These 
are located in the Galilee lowlands. Banana plantations are found on the sub-
tropical plainlands. In the northern part of the Negev, farming is being devel-. 
oped and in the more promising areas intensified. Vegetables, whe·at sorghum, 
barley and sunflowers are· the principal crops grown at present~ There is a con-
siderable number of livestock including cattle, sheep and goats. As a matter of 
fact, the country6s bee·f cattle have increased from 1,000 head in 1948 to 
15,000 head in 1959; the dairy cattle from 18,800 head to 44,000 head during 
the samepenod. Meat production in 1957-58 amounted to 18,500 tons, an in-
crease· of 18 percent over the previous year •. Farm c~mmunities and rural set-
tlements are of many types in Israel. They range from the 11k ibbutz 11 (communal 
collective settlements), where al I property and earnings are collectively owned 
and work is organized the same·way, to the 11 moshava 11 (village) in which land 
and property are privately owned and every re·sident is responsible for his own 
wel I-being. -
· The United States has given lsrad technical assistance in sevetal 
branche·s of agricultural activit~ for instance·, animal husbandry. This has been 
mainly in I ivestock breeding for beef production. 6 Poul try production in terms 
5u. s. Department of State J>ubl i cation, Fact Sheet f Israel I Near and 
Middle Eastern Series 51, (Washington, D. i. 1 1960)~. --
6tbid. I P• 7. 
of egg laying has been increased and poultry diseases have been checked •. Range 
and forestry assistance has been provided. Work has also been done with field 
and horticultural crops and progress is being made to place all agricultural re-
search under the direction of the Agricultural Research Station. In .agricultural 
l 
education, a number of buildings have be·en renovated and equipped for the Tech-
nical Agricultural Institute, training courses for agricultural teachers have been 
established, and homemaking courses have been introduced in secondary schools.7 
lsrael 8s industries of manufacturirig or processing are also on the upswing.8 
Mony products are manufactured or processed 5 including chemicals, textiles, 
paper1 metal products, plastics, leather goods, building materials, ceramics/and 
electric goods such as refrigerators and radios (see Tqble t). Israel ns known 
natural resources are limited consisting mainly of potash! bromine and other de-
posits of the Red Sea. Other resources om copper and oil. Approximately 
200,000 t~ns of oil were produced in 1957. This country is, to a great extent, 
dependent upon raw materials from the outside world •. Domestic markets are. 
. . 
I imited and outside trade is an important factor in the economy~ Israel has had 
to utitize foreign capital 5 both privote and pub! ic 11 in order to keep the trade 
balance favorable and to finance internal development programs •. The United 
States has been helping Israel since 1951. This congressional legislation set up 
a program compatible to both the Jews and Arabs. Some of the primary 
i, bid o I Po 7 o 
8u. S. Department of State Pub I ication, The Newly Independent Nations, 
.. Israel, Near and Middle Eastern Series 58, (Washington, D. C., 1960}u p. 5. 
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assistance has been in the development .of water re·sources. The Yarkon Rive·r pro-
ject has been used to supplywater for irrigation in the Negev and supplementing 
the water :supply of Tel Aviv. Other programs have been used to increase power 
generation. Most recent aid has been to assist in the procurement of basic food-
stuffs, petroleum products, raw materials and heavy equipment for agriculture, 
industry and railways. A ceramics and Rubber Institute has been organized and 
a pilot plant for petrochemicals has been equipped and technical assistance pro-
vided in organizing activities and training personnel. Assistance has been given 
in developing equipment requirements for a plastics pilot plant. The state has 
modernized its entire railway system; and in addition to technical cooperation on 
this project, some of the· heavy equipment mentioned above have been diesel 
locomotives. 
Following is an excerpted summary of United States economic assistance 
to Israel: 9 
"Total official United States economic assistance programmed for Israel, 
from 1948, when the state was created through the fiscal year ending June 30 1 
1959, amounts to $634.6 million, This includes aid of $326.4 million under the 
Mutual Security program 1 broken down as follows: development of special assist-
once, $292. l million; technical cooperation 1 $9.3 million; Development Loan 
Fund 1 $25 million. 
"Surplus agricultural commodities 1 sold to Israel for local currency under 
9u. S. Department of State Pub!i cation 1 Fact Sheet I Israel, Near and 
Middle Eastern Series 51, (Washington, D. C,, 1960)~3.--
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PubHc law 480, title I, have amounted to $130.3 mi!lion. Of this amount, 
$9L 7 mitl ion has been loaned back to Israel for development financing •. Unite·d 
States·vol.untary agencies provided $52 million worth of agricultural commodities 
uncler title Ill of Public ~aw 480. 
' 
11The United States Export-Import Bank has provided Israel with credits · 
totalling $162.2 million for development projects. 11 
Jorpan 
Jordan is another newly independent state that has existed i-n its present 
fqrm" of constitutional monarchy government since May 25, 1946. It was pre-
viousry -a-part of the British Mandate for Palestine. The qrea of Jordan can only· 
. be approximated due to the undefined borders; however, it is· pbout 37,500 
square miles, some five times the size of Israel. In 1960 the latest av-aHabl~ 
population was 1,600,000 of which 475,000 are Arab Palestinians who lost their 
home- in Israel as a result of the conflict there. 10 This group constitutes a heavy 
burden ·of unemployment on the Jordanian economy •. The 'principal crties are: 
Amman, the capital, population 204,000; lrbidu population 50,000; Al Karak, 
population 40,000; and the old portion of Jerusalem with an estimated popula-
tion of 75,000. l l Amman is located to the east of the Jordan River and was 
_ 
10u. S. Bepdrtment of State Publication; The Newly Independent Ntii-
·---- _....;., 
· tions,_ Jordan, Near and Middle Eastern Series 57, (Washington, D. C., ,}96Q, p. I. 
11 . ' 
lbid.,p. l. 
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once called Rabbath Ammon, stronghold of the Ammonites •. The Egyptians later 
rebuilt the city under Ptolemy Philadelpheus and named it Philadelphia after him. 
As such, it is the most historically famous city in the country with the exception 
of the 11old city 11 of Jeruscilem with its many sites of religious value. In t~e 11old 
city u I ive a number of Christians who constitute 12 percent of the population,. 
the remainder being Moslem. 
Jordon has a primarily pastoral and agricultural econdmy composed of small 
landholders. Nine percent of its land is arable, of this, only 80 percent is under 
cultivation. The east bank of the Jordan River is the most fertile in the country 
and-has suffered. I ittle from erosion and ove·rcropping. 
The west bank located on the leeward side of the Judean m·ountains has 
I ittle rainfal I and is severely denuded except for some terraced farms .. As rain-
fall in general is irregular, crop production from year to year is unpredictable 
and great fluctuations occur. This tends to keep the economy unstabilized and 
contributes to the trade gap between imports and exports. Chief crops of Jordan 
are: mil let, maize, barley, wheat, vegetables, fruits and olives. Forest re-
serves are insignificant. Livestock raising is, of course, the main pursuit of the 
Bedouin tribes and is an important element of the country 1s economy. Jordan 1s 
mineral resources are of minor importance. Potash from the De·ad Sea and 
phosphates from Rosaifa and Hasa are the most important. Oil exploration has 
been done, but as yet I no oil has been found. No coal or I ignite deposits are 
known, therefore hydroelectric power is very important to the economy. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE GEOPOLITICAL PATTERNS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 
United States Policy and Interests 
The primary determinant of United States foreign policy in the Middle 
East I ies in the following statement made by President Truman in March of 1947: 
11 Total itarian regimes imposed upon free peoples by dirrecf or indirect aggrression 1 
undermine the foundation of international peace and hence the security of the 
United States. u l Security is not only a determinant but also an objective. The 
overal I pol icy is implemented in a, type of iucasual containment. 11 Th is contain-
ment in the Middle East is a more passive type, due in part to the area being 
farther away from the Russian heartland and Soviet sphere of influence, than in 
the more· contnguous areas of Central Europe. The iong range objective thete-
fore is to bring a peaceful and lasting settlement to middle eastern problems 
which, in turn, will satisfy United States political, economic and ideological 
objectives. There are several sol ient pol lcies and arrangements that enhance 
the primary objective. Included are .such things as military agreementsv treaties 
1 U. S. Department of State Publ icationu The Dev~lopment of United 
States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951, Near and Middle Eastern Series 
No. 5, (Washington-;-1952), p. 84-0. 
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and pacts. Also economic aid, technical assistance and ·outright grants are very 
important. In addition there are Development Loan Fund loans, surplus farm pro~ 
ducts under the Public Law 4~0 program, and loans from the Import-Export Bank. 
The following table shows United States government aid to this area from 
1948 through 1959: 2 
LJ. -s~ Government Economic Aid 
to Israel since May 1 1948 
Fiscal Year 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953· 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
Grand Total: 
(In millions) 
none 
none· 
135.0 
none 
63.5 
73.7 
54.0 
54.6 
54.4 
37.5 
89.2 
52.4 
U. S. Government Economic Aid 
· to Arab States since May, 1948 
(In millions) 
7.3 
none 
none 
4.8 
9.5 
20. 1 
25.8 
56.2 
39.2 
37.68 
70. 9 
114. 5 
$386§480;000* 
*-These-fi-gtl1"eS'suppHed--by-the ·L:Jrrited.,·States·govemmen t ex c I ude Amer i-
can donations to Palestine refugee relief r which have ranged betwee·n 
· $20,000,000 and $30,000,000 a year from 1949 to the present. 
In addition to the above--Turkey, the eastern anchor of NATO, (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization) has received almost three billion dollars in United 
State,s aid and continues to be a primary recipient of aid in the area. 
2Harry B. Ellis, Challenge· in the Middle East, (New York, 1960).f p. 96. 
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Since World War II, the Middle East has remained an area of strqtegic im-
pbrtance because of its proximity to the Iron Curtain. The region constitutes a 
land bridge between three continents and militarily, although the West does not 
wish to conquer or dominate the area, it could ill afford to stand by and see it 
ruled by irresponsible self-seekers who pose as communist sympathizers. Th~ 
United States has NATO (Turkey) and the Central Treaty organization (Turkey, 
Iran and Pakistan) which provide mutual security anp assistance. Also there are 
bilateral agreements with Lebanon , Israel and Saudi .Arabia. 
Oil is one of the main reasons for the importance of the Middle East in 
world politics. 3 The United States, Britain, France , and Holland have oil in-
terests in the region, but the interests of the first two are by far the largest. 
Britain is dep-endent on Middle East oil for her very economic existence. The 
energy needs of Britain, the revenue from the oil and the difficulty she would 
have in financing the purchase of oil from the dollar area are the chief reasons 
for this dependency . If President Nasser of Egypt became master of this region 
he could nationalize its oil and Br itain and Western Europe would be at his 
mercy. He has already shown what consequence the West could expect if free 
passage of shipping through the Suez Canal is interrupted. 
The West has valuable strategic ai r bases and numerous staging posts in 
the area , for example, Dhahran , Saudi Arabia. This base , however, will lose 
3 
George Lenczowski , Oil and State in the Middle East, (New York, 
1960), p. 1. 
its military value within the next year due to a reluctance on the part of the 
Saudi Arabian government to extend our mi!Hary mission to that country. The·se 
bases are mainly to provide protection for our economic interests and to counter 
any overt communist encrnachment in the Middle East. 
The Western pol icy towards the Middle East is one of development of 
stable; viable, and friendly govemme·nts in the area; capable of withstanding 
communist inspired subversion from within and wU I ing to resist communist agres= 
sion. 4 Additionally; the West is vHa!ly interested in assuring protection of oil 
rights; strategic positions; and traditional passage rights in the area. 
Although Britain and the Unite,d States share· the same interests in con-
taining communism, in the past they have reacte·d differently to political situ-
ations in this region; and their policies have not always been harmonious. 
Britain adopted a firm pol icy nn the Middle East while the United States favored 
evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone, wavered on British at= 
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tempts to create an international authority for the· Cana! v and opposed the Anglo-
French intervention in Egypt. The Soviet tried to widen the rift by playing one 
side against the other. Fortunately 1, talks be·tween Eisenhower and MacMillan 
helped to strengthen relations andu through the Eisenhower Doctrine; Amerkan 
armed forces are permitted to assist any Middle East country requesting aid 
against ove·rt armed aggression from any nation control led by international 
4u. S. Department of State Pub! icationu United States Foreign Pol icy 
in the Middle East u Ne,::ir and Middle Eastern Series 25 1 (Washingtonu 1957); 
pp. 1-5. 
communism.5 However, the communists are masters in the art of subversion and 
Infiltration and the Eisenhower Doctrine provides no counter to npeacefu! 11 Soviet 
subversion. Perhaps the Truman doctrine should provide this assistance· but this is 
controlled by domestic politics. 
Several activities in the Middle East show that the Eisenhower Doctrine 
has been superseded. 6 The anti-western riots in Lebanon resulted in Amed can 
troops being flown into Turkey and Lebanon. Likewiseu the murder of King 
Feisal in Iraq prompted King Hussein of Jordan to appeal for aid for his country 
and Britain flew in paratroopers and jet aircraft. The Brrifo!, move into Jordan u 
I ike the American precautions in Lebanon and Turkey I claim United Nations 
justification •. A government which be! ieves itself threatened with aggression is 
entitled to seek aid. The aim of the Jordan intervention was threefold: to pre-
vent a repetition of the Iraqi events;: to preserve Jordan°s independence; and to 
free the Jordan army and security forces to deal with any attempted coup d 8etat. 
The British and American view on the situation was that if Al I ied troops 
had not landed in Jordan and Lebanon 1 King H11Jssein and President Chamoun 
might have been assassinated. There· were only two dear-cut choices 1 interven= 
tion or withdrawal. if they wothdrew from the regionu lr"would mean completely 
changing their pol icy u coming to terms with Arab naHona!ism, and negotiating 
with Egypt 0s President Nasser. 
51bid., pp. 211-358. 
6 
Harry B. Ellis, Challenge~ the Middie Eastu (New York 1 1960), 
pp. 180-201. 
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The West wanted the United Nations to take over protection of the inde.;. 
pendence of the Middle East 1,s small states under the auspices of a United Nations 
Commission in the area. However, if the United Nations Organization is as un-
·. successful in protecting its members against the new· technique of subversion as it 
has been in halting open aggression, the West must defend freedom on its own. 
-fhe West realizes that no problems were solved by the ·show of force in Lebanon 
and Jordan, and that anti-western ism ih the Arab world may be strengthened. 
-However, the alternative of allowing the whole of the Middle East to fol I into 
Nasser 1s hands was unthinkable. 
The Western Powers planned to leave their forces in Lebanon and Jordan 
until the United Nations General Assembly had solved the disturbance. The 
Lebanon crisis was essentially a domestic matter, even though Nasser 0s Soviet-
supported United Arab Republic had been subverting Lebanon°s moslem elements 
and providing aid for the rebels. 7 The international rmpl ications were exagger-
ated, President Chamoun agreed to step down and was replaced by General 
Chehab, who summarily suggested a date for withdrawal. 
· The situation i.n Jordan is difficult to unravel. King Hussein was deter-
mined to avenge King Feisa18s death, but.ihe soon realized the futility of such 
action when forcefully told that British troops would not assist him. Britain. 
feared that as soon as her troops left Jordan, endeavors would be made to assas-
sinate King Hussein, and that Nasser would soon gain control of the country~ 
Israel is also anxious; some.of her politicians advocate attacking West Jordan, 
7 tbid., pp. 133-135. 
arguing that if they do not attack Nasser will soon have Jordan under his in-
fluence and Israel 1s security would be jeopardized under- these conditions. 8 
The United State·s is hoping for the formation. of an effective United Na-
rions force, permanently situated in the Middle· East, authorized to investigate 
subversion and interference, and able to move quickly to protect threatened bor-
ders. When this happens, Britain and the United Stat~s might be agreeable to 
withdrawing their troops from the area. Western influence has certainly waned 
during the last few years, but present Western strategy appears designed to up-
hold the independence of the smal I countries and in particu~ar to protect oil 
sources and outlets in the region, The eventual recapture of lost prestige will 
result and their position wil I be enhanced. 
Soviet Pol icy and Interests 
In January of 1957, President Eisenhower stated: 11 The problem today is 
a conflict of ideologies, on the one· hand based around the dignity and rights of 
the individual and on the other the rights and power of the state. 119 In essence 
i-t is evide·nt that the sole determinate of Soviet fore·ign pol icy in the Middle 
East is 11power politics. 11 Specific Soviet interests in the· area- are twofold: to 
neutralize Western.strategic bases, thus outflanking and isolating NATO; and 
81bid., p. 214. 
9U. S. Departme·nt of State Publication, United States Foreign Pol icy 
in the· Middle East, Near and Middle E'astern Series 25, (Washington, 1957), 
pp:-tl-23. -
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to deny Western Europe vital oil resources. The Soviet beli~ves that in close al-
liance with Nasser she could control the Middle East. This would accomplish 
multiple goals for her as it would : ensure an abundant oil supply; isolate India 
from the Middle Eatt and Europe; open the Atlantic and Indian Oceans to her sub-
marine fleet; and pave the way for Russian dominat ion of Europe , Africa and 
Asia . The shift in the world balance of power could be decisi ve if Soviet pene-
tration was successful , and could result in complete Russian hegemony . 
The aim of t~e Soviet Union is to intensify unrest. Any p-ol iti cal d istur-
bance, any social unrest, any economic hardsh ip that would best serve this goal 
is the objective. With this clear-cut objective in mind , the Soviet Union fol-
lowed a consistent and very successful policy . Until 1955, the Russ-ions hod 
ma>wn little interest in the Middle East, but whil~ the West remained in a quandry 
over theArob-lsroel i dispu-tes , the Russians adopted a pol icy of host ii ity towards . 
Israel and assumed the role of champion of Arab nat ional ism. 10 In porti cular, it 
was important for Soviet pol icy that no peace settlement should be reached with 
lsraet and that Arab hatred and fears should be ompl ified. 
The Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was cla imed to be a preventive war 
since there was evidence that Egypt was plann ing on offensive against Israel. 
The subsequent Anglo-French interven t ion could not be regarded ~s a political 
success. This action ser iously weakened Britain °s influence in the area and under-
mined her international prestige and moral stand ing . Russia did everything 
10Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East, (New York , 1960), 
p. 20. 
possible to decry the British and French as aggressors and her prestige rose high 
throughout the Arab world. Russia 's pol icy of championing Arab national ism has 
paid dividends. At presen t she is trying to consolidate her position in Syria, 
Egypt and Iraq. It is considered that present Soviet policy does not include any 
plan to embroil her forces in a global war. Her basic pol icy of intensifying un-
rest remains unchanged. 
Mr. Khrushchev 's exploi ts in the Arab world, through Nasser , are a key 
34 
to his design for victory in the cold wa r. His original demand fo r Summit talks 
was changed to a proposal for the United Nations General Assembly to consider 
urgent- aspects of the Middle East crisis. The Western Powers ag reed to this pro-
posal, re-al izing that the Soviet Union would brand the West as agg ressors and 
would try to talk the Western Powers into removing their forces from Lebanon and 
Jordan. The new Presiden t of Lebanon, General Chehab, demanded the with-
drawal of American marines irrespecti ve of United Nations deliberation. Further-
more, Britain 's position became increasingly difficult in Jordan. Because Israel 
cancel led permission for Briti sh and American ai rcraft to fly over her territory, 
providing supplies to British troops is a lengthy process , parti cularly if-the Cape 
route is used. 
Mr. Khrushchev bid and consummated a political foothold in the Middle 
East. His strategy was to use Nasser, in the name of Arab national ism, to win 
control over all the important oil prod ucing countr ies in the region . The price 
and_ flow of oil could then be regula ted in the fo rm of economic blackmail against 
West European countries in the hope of destroying both the Baghdad Petet ·and 
NATO. Because Nasser might have his own plans and welcome a chance to 
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reduce his dependence on Russia 1 he was reluctant tc:> carry out Khrushchev 1s bid-
ding. Any Nasser rebuff to the Russians could affect Mr. Khrushchev's personal 
power in the Kremlin, Russians are adept at making satellites of leaders who de-
pend upon them v even in part I for econom k support. Because Khrushchev has 
had many difficulties with Yugoslavia and almost lost Poland and Hungary; he 
cannot afford to lose face at this juncture. Any moderate We·stem success, such 
as keeping Lebanon and Jordan out of Nasser's hands, or of restoring a semblance 
of stab ii ity in the area, would lower Khrushchev's prestige and be a defeat in the 
Soviet 0s eyes, 
The popularity of Nasser wnth the Soviet is dearly shown in the fact that 
they have maintained relations wlth him despite the failure of the UnHed Arab 
Republic, This collapse was due mainly to the se·cession of Syda on September 29 1 
1961. 11 
From the first days of the Iraqi revolution of July 14, 19589 the Soviet 
· Union began a long-term massive effort to plant its influence firmly in Baghdad, 
Not only was the opportunity there to ddve the Communist pol itnca! wedge 
deeper into the Middle East;: there was also the· chanceu through trade and aid 
dealsv to siphon off some of Iraq's pounds sterling to help meet Russia's hard cur-
rency commitments in the West. 
As with President Nasseru so wHh the il'aqi regime of Abdel Karim Kassem 1 
11 Moscow dangled the lure of speedy industda!ization through !ow-interest credits 
11 l'Jew York Times, (New York 1 September 29 1 1961 L p. 1. 
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advanced without political strings. The bait was snapped up 1 partly because Iraqi 
Communists were active in the new re·gime 1 but also because Iraqis in general u cut 
off entirely from the Communist bloc by the former government of Nurri es-Said 1 
had bee·n ready to accept the Soviets at face value as techno!ogica! supermen who 
had launched the first sputnik and photographed the back side of the moon before 
anyone in the West' had done so. 18 12 
Current Soviet strategy is one of propaganda 0 b! iJlff and b'! uster. The 
Soviets desire to be recognized as having a zone of influence in the Middle East 
in the same way as the United States has in Saudi Arabia and Britain has in the 
Persian Gulf. The Soviet already has more than an interest in Egypt v Syriai Iraq 
and Yemen. it is obvious that she wcmts her influence to spread throughout the 
whole of the Middle East. 
12 
· Harry B. El!isu Challenge in the Middle Eastu (New York 1 1960); 
p • .143. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Future Trends 
The future of the Middle East is one of uncertainty, and it is I ikely to be 
this way for years to come. The United Nations General Assembly has discussed 
the situation and has accepted a resolution later rejected by the Arab peoples. 
Briefly, the Arab plan cal led for the Arabs to respect each other 1s sovereignty 
and instructed the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammar-
sk joeld, to find a means of settling Lebanon 1s and Jordan 1s internal troubles and 
allowing British and American troops to withdraw. 
On the surface, it would appear that Nasser gained a victory and the 
countries of the Middle East should soon be restored to a state of peaceful co-
existence. However, this is not the case; Nasser, an ambitious, dictatorial, 
but popular leader throughout the Arab world, is determined to unite the Mid-
dle East in one Republic with himself as President. Subversion, infiltration, 
and propaganda broadcasts will continue despite any United Nations direction. 
In the meantime, Nasserism wil I continue to grow, fostered and encour-
aged by the Soviet, or fol I due to the vagaries of Arab politics. Nasser 1s next 
target is the oil-rich Sheikdoms along the Persian Gulf. He will not attempt to 
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take over by direct action. He wil I require Iraq to express its claims of these 
territories. Although the Sheiks in this area believe in Arab national ism and 
dislike communism, they do not want to forego the luxuries that oil has brought 
them. Recent events in Iraq have shown that monarchy is outdated in this area, 
that the people of the Middle East detest this type of regime, and that eventu-
ally these ruling Sheikdoms wil I be overthrown and independent governments set 
up. Saudi Arabia will also follow this pattern. 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf region have too much to lose 
by joining Nasser's United Arab Republic as full members. Certainly Nasser 
will have a tremendous influence in their affairs, but he will not be able to 
stop oil flowing to Western Europe in peacetime because of the economic im-
p! ications to the Middle Eastern states concerned. Subsequently, the West wil I 
have to withdraw from these areas when requested and face up to the prospect 
of having to pay more for their oil, and the possibility of uncertain deliver. The 
West could not expect Middle East oil in a global war. The oil states would in-
voke neutrality and stop all oil deliveries to the West. This would be due to 
I imited production operations and part I y from local fear of the Soviet. However, 
since the West is the major user of this oil it is obvious that in peacetime the 
West will receive th is oil at a high price . 
General Chehab 's political affiliations are not fully known, but Lebanon 
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is I ikel y to steer a neutralist course until" pressure from within and also from Egypt 
and Syria forces her to join the pro-Arab nationalism cause. Israel will then be 
the only non pro-Nasser state in the region. In the past, Israel has been impulsive 
and has already stated her intention of taking over West Jordan. Meanwhile, 
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pressure from the United Nations will deter Israel from- any aggression, but if the 
Arabs attempt to build up forces to move against her:, she wit I attack. Under 
these circumstances, Israel might have the· West 0s backing and another grave situ-
ation could materialize. 
Conclusion 
The Middle East has great geographic, strategic and economic signifi-
cance. In the last few years a struggle for influence and control in the· area has 
been in progress between the West, the Soviet Union, and the forces of Arab 
nationc:ilism. President Nasse·r has played heavily on the nationalist, anti-
cotonial ist sentiment in the Arab wor!d 1 and has emerged as the Arab 1s champion 
against the old feudal dynasties. Russia has vigorously supported Nasser with 
arms, technical, and economic aid, pnd- consequently she now has a major in-
fluence in Middle East affairs. 
The landing of British and American troops in the area, although in-
cteasing Arab national ism and invak ing outbursts from Moscow and Cairo, has 
shown a firmness and decisiveness which surprised the Soviets. Likewise, the 
C 
Western Powers were surprised by the coup_ d 0etat in Iraq which took that coun-
· try out of the West 1s sphere of influence and further undermined the West 0s po-
~ition in the Middle East. 
In spite of the secession from the United Arab Republic by Syria on 
September 29, 1961, the growth of Nasser ism and Arab national ism is so power-
ful it could eventually bring about the complete col lapse of Western influence 
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in the area. 1 If this is what the Arab populace wants, then the World Powers 
should accept it. Oil will still be delivered in peacetime to the West but the 
price will be high •. This will suit Soviet strategy, since, while Nasser continues 
to dominate the political scene the Soviets wil I be able to wield considerable in-
fluence· in Middle East affairs. The British have recognize·d th is situation and 
recently they moved to restore diplomatic relations with the Arabs, relations 
that were severed in October, 1956, by the Suez invasion. On January 15, 
1961, Mr. Harold Seeley was named ambassador to Cairo and Mohammed Al Kuni 
was named ambassador to London. What affect this will have on the overall stra-
tegy of the West .could, at its best, be only conjecture. For certain, the United 
States will be forced to reevaluate its position. It is also evident that the paci-
fist leanings of Ben-Gurion in Israel are under fire and a dynamic, militant 
leader there could well be the trigger that breaks the impasse rn the Middle 
' East. More impressive is that an international power play could be in the offing. 
Again, in concluding, the suggestion is made thcit certaih portions of the 
Middle East be considered as possible 11World Monuments. •i The Holy Land (see 
page 10) lends itself most fittingly to this situation and could wel I serve as the 
first area to be so recognized. This could be the key to preve,ntion of local 
hostilities in the· Middle East. 
1 New York Times, ( New Yorkv September 29, 1961 ) , p. 1. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXTRACTS FROM 
Publications of the Department of State , Near Eastern Series , No . 1, Mandate 
For Palestine , P. 7. 
Zionism is a movement of return; in parti cula r it is the movement of an 
organized body of modern Jewry fo r the establ ishment in Palestine of a national 
home for the Jews . In its broader aspect it dates from the final destruc tion 
(135 A. D . ) of the Jewish Kingdom and the resu lting ed ict of Rome which denied 
to the Jews fu rther access to Palest ine; fo r, scattered throughout the world, the 
Jewish people have e ver held tenaciously to the ideal of reestabl ishment in thei r 
ancien t homeland. In its modern sense , Z ionism may be sa i<l t.o do te from the 
beginnings of Jewish recoloniza tion in Pa lestine in 1880 fo ll ow ing persecutions 
in eastern European countries , and from the summoning in 1897 at Basie of a 
Congress of Jews which defi ned the· mean ing of Zioni sm as the effort to win "a 
legally secured , publicly recogn ized Home fo r the Jewish People in Palestine . " 
The original program of the Zionist organiza tion was to obta in , with the 
appro \!al .ofthe powersu u charte r from the O ttoman Government au thori z ing the 
real iza tion of its a im. Fa iling in this , its leaders concentrated the ir efforts on 
co lonizat ion projec ts a nd on foste ring in the minds of Jews throughout the world 
the idea of the crea tion in Pa lestine of what was termed "a home fo r the Jew ish 
sp irit." With the ad ven t of the World Waru howeve r, a new opportunity was 
offe red to the Zionist leaders to press fo r the recognition and support of their 
ori g inal program . · Their ove rtures fin a lly met with success in London, where on 
November 2 , 1917, Mr. Balfour, the n His Majesty°s Pri nc-ipal Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affai rs, issued what has since come to be known as "the Bal four 
Declarat ion ," reading as fol lows: 
His Majesty 0s Gove rnment view with fa vour the esrobl ishment in Palestine 
of a national home fo r the Jewish peopl ( and will use their best endeavous to 
facilitate the ach ie vement of this obj t!ct, it be ing clearly understood that noth ing 
shall be done which may prejudice the civil a nd rel ig ious rights of exi st ing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine , or the ri ghts and pol it ical status enjoyed by the 
Jews in any other country. 
Ibid . , p. 10 
On December 11 , 1917, General Allenby entered the city of Jerusalem . 
With the occupation of northern Palestine a nd Syria , follow ing the bril -
liant advance of September, 1918, a first endeavor was made to meet the var ious 
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political claims discussed in the preceding section of this report. Under the su-
preme command of General Allenby as commander in chief, France assumed 
administrative responsibility in Syri a from the coast to the anti-Lebanon, an Arab 
administration was set up in Damascus and the hinterland, and British control was 
extended over all of Palestine west of the Jordan. This tentative division of con-
trol was confirmed in the Fra nco-Briti sh mil itary convention of September 15, 
1919, which, at the same time , abolished the office of the commander in chief. 
The final status of Palestine , complicated as it was by Arab pretensions, 
Zionist aspirations, and Al I ied agreements pointing to an eventual international 
control , became a subject of Allied discussions at the Peace Conference which 
had met in Paris in December, 1918. There the theory of the mandatory system 
was evolved, and it was of the O ttoman Empi re , a solution of the problem would 
be found. 
Meanwhile , in Palest ine , under Brit ish military adm inistration , consider-
able progress was made towards the creat ion of a stable form of government and 
the rehabilitation of the economic l ife of the country . 
Ibid., p. 13 
Arti cle 2 
The Mandatory shal I be responsible for placing the country under such 
political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establish-
ment of the Jewish national home , as laid down in the Preamble , and the devel-
opment of self-governing institutions , and a lso for safeguarding the civil and 
religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palest ine , irrespective of race and rel i-
gion. 
Art icle 4 
An appropriate Jew ish agency shall be recognized as a public body for 
the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Admi nistration of Palestine in 
such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the 
Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish populat ion in Palestine, 
and, subject always to the con trol of the Administrat ion , to assist and take part, 
in the development of the country . 
The Zionist organisa tion , so long as its organisat ion and constitution 
are in the opinion of the Manda tory appropria te , shal I be recognised as such 
agency. It shall take steps in consulta tion with His Britannic Majesty's Gov-
ernment to secure the cooperat ion of all Jews who a re willing to assist in the 
establishment of the Jewish national home. 
Article 5 
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory 
shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under- the control of .the Gov-
ernment of any foreign Power. 
Ibid O I P· 107 
American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924. 
"Whereas by the Treqty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers, 
Turkey renounces al I her rights and titles over Palestine; and whereas recog-
nition has thereby been given to the historical connection on the Jewish people 
with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that 
country;.- • • • 11 
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APPENDIX B 
EXTRACTS FROM 
Anglo-American Committee of Inqui ry, Report of the United States Government 
and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, April 20, 1946, U. S.D. S. 
p . vii . 
We were appointed by the Governments of the United States and of the 
United Kingdom , as a joint body of American and British membership, with the 
following Terms of Reference: 
1. To ex!.lmine political , economic and social conditions in Palestine as 
they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the 
well-being of the peoples now living therein. 
2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe 
where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution , and the prac-
tical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable 
them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of 
those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or 
other countries outside Europe. 
3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representa-
tive Arabs and Jews on t~ problems of Palest ine as such problems are affected 
by conditions subject to examination under paragraphs 1 and 2 above and by 
other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His 
Majesty 's Government and the Gove rnment of the United States for ad interim 
handling of these problems as well as for thei r permanent solution. 
4 . To make such other recommendat ions-to His Majesty's Government 
and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet the im-
mediate needs arising from cond itions subject to examination under paragraph 
2 above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the 
provision of facilities for em igration to and settlement in countr ies outside 
Europe. 
Ibid., P· 49 
We have considered the matter anew and we have heard the views of 
various witnesses of great experience . Parti t ion has an appeal at first sight as 
giving a prospect of early independence a nd self-government to Jews and Arabs , 
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but in our view no partition would have any chance unless it was basically ac-
ceptable to Jews and Arabs , and there is no sign of that today. We are accord-
ingly unable to recommend pa rtition as the solution. 
51 
4. Palestine is a country uni ike any other. It is not merely a place in 
which Arabs and Jews live. Millions of people throughout the world take a fer-
vent interest in Palestine and in its Holy Places and are deeply grieved by the 
thought that it has been the seat of trouble for so long and .by the fear that it may 
well become the cockpit of another war. Lord Milner in 1923, having declared 
himself a strong supporter of pro:_Arab policy , said : 
11 Palestine can never be regarded as a country on the same footing as the 
other Arab countries. You cannot ignore all history and tradition in the matter. 
You cannot ignore the fact that this is the cradle of two of the great religions of 
the world. It is a sacred land to the Arabs , but it is also a sacred land to the 
Jew and the Christian; and the fu ture of Palestine cannot possibly be left to be 
determined by the temporary impressions and feelings of the Arab majority in the 
country of the present day. 11 
The Peel Commission hav ing cited those words wrote ( Chapter 11, para-
graph 51 ): 11 The case stated by Lord Milner aga inst an Arab control of Palestine 
applies equally to a Jewish con trol. 11 That expresses our view absolutely. 
Efforts have been made from time to time to encourage both Arabs and 
Jews to take part in the Governmen t of the country bu t these efforts have failed 
through mutual antagonism; perhaps they might have been pursued fu rther . It is 
not the case of a backward people going through a per iod of tutelage; the issue 
I ies between Jews and Arabs. 
We bel reve this can only be met by acceptance of the principle that 
there shal I be no domination of the one by the other, that Palestine sh al I be 
neither an Arab nor a Jewish State . The setting up of self-governing institutions 
is dependent on the wil I to work together on the part of Jews and Arabs. There 
has been I ittle sign of that in recen t years and yet we hope a change may take 
place if and when the fear of dominance is removed. We do not think that any 
good purpose would be served by our go ing into further detail ; once the wil I to 
work together appea rs, representat ives of both sides will be of help in framing 
a constitution; until that happens no step can be taken. 
Meantime Palestine must remain unde r some form of Mandate or Trustee-
ship. We have suggested elsewhere in our Report that much can be done to en-
courage general advancement by the improvement of educational facilities and 
measures directed to narrowing the soc ial and economic d isparities. We feel , 
too ; that it-sh-ouhf--be-possfb--l·e- to-draw th-e commun ities· doser together, and 
foster a popular interest as a spi r it of good neighbor! iness exists among the com-
mon people , Arabs and Jews, despite the general state of political tension in the 
country. Practical cooperation is e viden t in day-to-day affai rs. We suggest 
that local administrative areas might be formed, some purely Arab or Jewish in 
composition, but some of mixed population where a corporate sense of civic re-
sponsibility can be encouraged and a new beginning made in the development 
of self-government. 
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5. Land questions have been the cduse of much friction and dispute be·-
tween Jews and Arabs •. We are opposed to legislation and practices which dis-
criminate against either, and for the recrsons ·already· given we recommend the 
rescission and replacement of the Land Transfers Regulations of 1940 and the pro-
hibition of restrictions I imiting employment on certain lands to members of one 
race, community or creed. 
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Science Degree, with a major in Geography, in January, 
1962. 
Professional Experience: Entered the United States Army in 1941 
for duty with the Infantry i transferred to the Air Corps in 
1943; have served overseas in England;' Saudi Arabia and 
Japan; presently a Major in the United States Air Force 
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